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MARCH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-ONE

"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a
telephone company, yet which have n them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profoun'd interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT
MISSOURI CASES
PRACTICE-DECLARATION O1 LAw-DEMURRER To EVIDENCE. A. Jaicks
Co. v. Schoellkopf et al.1 In an action on six tax bills against certain
city lots owned by defendants, the defense was that the paving for which
the tax bills were issued was not done in compliance with the specifications of the paving contract. At the close of conflicting testimony as to
the quality of the work plaintiff asked for the following declaration of
law: "The court, sitting as a jury, declares the law to be that, under the
pleadings and testimony in this case the judgment must be for the plaintiff" etc. (Italics supplied.) The declaration was given, defendant excepting.
The expression, "sitting as a jury," as italicized above is useless and
possibly harmful. The court as a jury does not declare the law. The
1.

(1920)

220 S. W. 486.
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court as a court declares the law to the court as a jury. It is unfortunate that the word "court" is used in two different senses. Perhaps it
would be better to say that the court, i.e., the judge, declares the law to
himself as a jury. If the person who drew the instruction had the opinion that the court in declaring the law acts in any different capacity in
the event that there is a jury of one, viz, the trial judge, as distinguished from a jury of twelve, then he had a fundamental misconception. In
any event it will avoid confusion if the expression "sitting as a jury"
is omitted even in the event of the trial judge occuping a dual r6le.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court in an opinion by Bond, J., held that
the declaration of law was erroneous because it excluded from the
court sitting as a jury any consideration of the conflict in the evidence.
On a motion for rehearing, 2 an opinion per curiam was rendered holding
that the declaration was erroneously given, also that the opinion of
Bond, J., was erroneous; that the declaration of law did not exclude
consideration of the conflict in the testimony, but that the trial court
had passed on the evidence of the defendant and erred in deciding that
it was totally insufficient to sustain the defense.
The per curiam opinion further says, "the instruction given for the
plaintiff is in effect a peremptory instruction, and in effect was a demurrer to the evidence offered by the defendant." Again, "In other
words, it was a demurrer to the evidence." Such use of legal terminology does not aid in clarifying but serves to confuse.
It was at one time held in MissouriP that a declaration of law, (by
the court before whom the case was tried without a jury) "that on the
pleading and evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover" means merely
that the court finds for the plaintiff. But in Patterson v. K. C. F. S. and
M. R. Co.,4 where there was a trial before the court, without a jury,
it was held in a case where there was a contested issue of fact that a
finding for the paintiff was erroneous upon a declaration of law that
upon the pleadings and evidence plaintiff is entitled to recover. It is
now understood that a declaration of law, where there is a trial before the court, is for the purpose of showing the appellate court upon
what theory of law the trial court has proceeded. 5
Viewed in this light it is apparent that the declaration of law in
the principal case was erroneously given because there was substantial
evidence to sustain the defense and the trial court by its declaration
shows that it acted upon the hypothesis that there was not substan2.
3.

(1920) 220 S. W. 486.
Hess v. Clark (1882) 11 Mo. App.

695, 129 S. W.
(1910)
149 Mo.

257;
App.

Hall v.
379, 130

Smith
S. W.

492.
4. (1892) 47 Mo. App. 570.
5. Butts v. Gunby and West (1909)
135 Mo. App. 28, 115 S. W. 493; Hell.

449; Zahm v. Royal Fraternal Union of
St. Louis (1910) 154 Mo. App. 70, 133
S. W. 374; Schoen & Co. v. Hugunin
(1911)
156 Mo. App. 68, 135 S. W.

muth v.

967.

Benoist

(1910)

144

Mo. App.
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tial evidence to sustain the defense. That error was all that was needed
to justify a reversal of the judgment and to say that the declaration
of law has the effect of a demurrer to the evidence or is a demurrer
to the evidence adds no light on the subject.
The Missouri Code of Civil Procedure 6 contains no provision for
a demurrer to the evidence. While the common law demurrer to the
evidence is not expressly abolished, the status of that demurrer following the decisions of Gibson v. Hunter7 and Fowle v. Common Council
of Alexandria8 leaves little room for doubt that the references in the
Missouri cases to a demurrer to the evidence do not mean the common law demurrer to evidence. What is usually meant by this expression is a motion for a directed verdict, and it is submitted that it
is desirable to call this motion by its proper name.
On the whole, it seems that the per curiam opinion was not clarifying. Bond, J., used unfortunate language in saying that "the court,
in effect, excluded from its view any consideration of the conflict in the
evidence." He reached the correct result, however.
R. E. M.

PRACTICE-PRIvILEGE op NoN-RnSIDENT WITNESS. Bledsoe v. Letson.' The St. Louis Court of Appeals in the above case laid down the
rule that a non-resident witness attending court in Missouri was not
privileged from service of civil process. The facts in the case are:

A, a resident of Illinois, was attending court in Missouri for the purpose

of testifying in a civil suit, and while so' doing was served with a summons in an action of deceit brought by B.
At common law suitors, witnesses and other persons interested
in a suit were privileged from arrest during their actual attendance at
court, including their coming and going.2 A capias could then be secured on almost any kind of complaint and most cases were started in
that way. 3 The rule had its origin in an effort to protect the courts
in the orderly administration of justice.

It was the arrest that inter-

fered with the court 4 and the privilege in many instances, tho not in all,
was limited to freedom from arrest. 5

The service was not always set

aside but the defendant was released upon gi'ing common bail which was
equivalent to an entry of appearance in the suit. 6 The non-resident
6.

R. S. Mo. 1909, Chap. 21, Art. V.

Pleadings.
7. (1793) 2 H. Blackstone, 187. (H.
of L.)
8. (1826) 11 Wheaton 320. (U. S.
Sup. Ct.)
1. (1919) 215 S. W. 513.
2. Tidd, Practice, 3d. Am. Ed. p.
195; 3 Blackstone, Lewis Ed., 289.

3.

4.
1094.
5.
99.
6.
mon
181.

3 Blackstone,

Lewis

Cole v. Hawkins

Ed.,

(1738)

Poole v. Gould (1856)

p. 282.

2 Stra.

1 H. & N.

Black's Law Dictionary-Title-ComBail; Long's Case (1658) 2 Mod.
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witness, however, was not only privileged from arrest but also from
service of process. 6a The reason for the rule was to promote justice
by encouraging the foreign witness to come into England and give his
testimony. For as Lord Mansfield said: "The service of the subpoena
abroad would be an useless form; he cannot be punished for not coming; if he comes at all, then it must be voluntarily."
The doctrine of privilege was early adopted in the United States and
liberally extended to freedom from service of civil process. The development of the American rule has been along a different line than
at English common law, because in many instances the distinction made
in the English cases between freedom from arrest and service of process was overlooked. The privilege at common law was that of the
court and the claim of the party was of minor importance. But in the
United States it was recognized that many of the parties would not
come to the forum as the individual regarded it desirable that he be
sued in his own jurisdiction. The privilege is invoked to protect this
7
policy as well as to aid the court in the administration of Justice.
That it is a personal as well as a judicial privilege is evident from the
decisions holding that the persons protected may waive the privilege.8
That a witness is immune from service while attending trial in a
state other than that of his residence is almost universally recognized by
the American courts." There is a conflict of authority as to whether
a non-resident suitor is entitled to a like exemption. Some courts while
allowing it to a non-resident witness deny it to a suitor, 10 but the great
weight of authority declares both parties and witnesses are alike entitled to the privilege, 1 ' tho it is obvious much can be said against extending the privilege to the case of the non-resident suitor.
The rule laid down in the principal case is directly opposed to the
great weight of authority, American and English. The court in its
opinion made no attempt to justify its decision upon reason or the weight
of authority, but relied soley upon previous decisions of the Missouri
Supreme Court. This was all that was said on the question: "Taking
up the question of the overruling of the defendants' plea in abatement,
we are satisfied that the plea was properly overruled. See Baisley v.
Baisley, 113 Mo, 544, 21 S. W. 29, 35 Am. St. Rep. 726; Christian v. Wil6a. Walpole v. Alexander

(1782)

3

Douglas 45.
7. Halsey v. Stewart (1817) 4 N. J.
L. 420; Jacobson v. Hosmer (1889) 76
Mich. 234, 42 N. W. 1110.
8. Sheehan & Loler Trans. Co. v.
Sims (1889) 36 Mo. App. 224.
9. Kauffman v. Kennedy (1885)
25
Federal 785;
Sherman v.
Gundlach
(1887) 37 Minn. 118, 33 N. W. 549;
Chittenden v. Carter (1909) 82 Conn.
585, 74 AtI. 884.

10. Baldwin v. Emerson (1888)

16 R.

I. 304, 27 Am. St. Rep. 741;.Guynn v.
McDaneld (1895) 4 Idaho 605. 43 Pac.
74.
11. Andrew v. Lembeck (1888) 46
Ohio St. 38, 18 N. E. 483; Hale v.
Wharton (1896) 73 Federal 739; June.
son Bank v. McSpadden 5 Biss. 64,
Federal Cases No. 7,582; Breon v. Mil.
ler Lbr. Co. (1909) 83 S. C. 221, 65 S.
E. 214; Diamond v. Earle (1914) 217
Mass. 499, 105 N. E. 363.
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liams, 111 Mo. 429, 20 S. W. 96; State ex rel v. Moore, 164 Mo. App.
649, 147 S. W. 551." (Becker, J.)
The first case relied upon is Christian v. Williams 12 which is authority only for the proposition that a resident defendant and witness
attending court in a county in Missouri other than that of his own
3
residence is not privileged. The next case, Baisley v. Baisley,' holds
that a non-resident who has brought suit in this state against another
non-resident is subject to service of civil process in a suit brought by
the person whom he has. sued.
The actual decisions were not very sweeping, but owing to the fact
4
that they are based upon a Missouri statute' they are capable of being
construed so as to entirely abolish privilege. Christian v. Williams was
brought under the first section of the statute and the court based its
ruling upon the words "was found." The statute was interpreted to
mean that the only requirement for getting service on a non-resident was
to find him in the county. Baisley v. Baisley was brought under the
fourth section of the statute which does not contain the words "was
found." Nevertheless, the decision was in part placed upon that ground.
Sherwood, J., evidently realized that the reading of the words "was
found" into the fourth section was more or less arbitrary for he gave
the additional reason that the defendant had voluntarily brought suit
5
in the state and cited the case of Bishop v. Vose,' a leading American
case, holding that such a party was not privileged. The decision can
be justified upon the latter basis. The defendant had voluntarily come
into the state asking the aid of its judicial machinery in enforcing his
claim and there would be no injustice in compelling him to assume the
6
burdens,1 and have causes against him tried by the same court.
The full effect of placing the decisions solely upon the statute is
seen in the position taken by the Court of Appeals in State ex rel v.
Moore."7 That case proceeds upon the theory that the effect of the
statute is to abolish all privilege in that it makes nc; exceptions. This
is carrying the doctrine further than Sherwood, J., thought it could be
carried. In Christian v. Williams, after holding the defendant was not
privileged, he said: "Of course these remarks do not apply to a case
where a party is induced by fraud or compelled by criminal process to
enter within the boundaries of a county other than that of his residence." If State ex rel. v. Moore is followed to its logical conclusion
the dicta in Christian v. Williams could not be law. The dicta is well
8
This is a clear exception to the statute and
supported by authority.'
12.
13.
14.
1751
15.

(1892) 111
(1893) 113
Sec. 1. R.
R. S. Mo.
(1858) 27

Mo. 429, 20 S. W. 96.
Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29.
S. Mo. 1889, now Sec.
1909.
Conn. 1.

16. Guynn v. McDaneld (1895)

4 Id-

aho 605, 43
17. (1912)
W. 551.
18. Marsh
Capitol City

Mo. 333.

Pac. 74.
164 Mo.

App. 649,

147 S.

v. Bast (1867) 41 Mo. 493;
47
Bank v. Knox (1871)
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the basis of the decision in State ex rel. v. Moore, i. e., there are no
exceptions to the statute, is in direct conflict with the privilege extended
to parties who are compelled by abuse of criminal process or induced by
fraud to come into a foreign Jurisdiction.
Christian v. Williams and Baisley v. Baisley, it is suggested, do
not present a sound application of the statute. In the Revised Statutes
of Missouri for 1879 the statute first appears in its present form and it
is headed:19 "Of the Plce for Bringing Suits." What the Legislature
intended to accomplish in revising and amending the statute was to
provide a forum for bringing suits. The "place where" the suit could
be instituted was pointed out but it was not intended to affect the other
rights of the parties. In its interpretation the Supreme Court isolated
the statute and lost sight of the principle that a statute should be construed with reference to coordinate rules and statutes. The most reasonable construction to place upon the statute is that it was intended to
run parallel with and not in derogation to any common law principle.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in holding that a statute similar to the
one in Missouri did not destroy privilege said:20 "If we should find a
well established principle of law exempting non-residents who are in
this state for ihe purpose of attending court as parties or witnesses, we
should be bound to construe the statute with reference to that principle, for we could not hold that the Legislature meant to disregard' it
and establish a new rule." 21
The Missouri Supreme Court has never directly passed upon the
privilege of a non-resident witness, but if the principles enunciated in
previous decisions are rigorously applied without regard for common
law principles,22 it will be held that he is not privileged. There is a
sound reason for making an exception to the operation of the statute in
the case of a non-resident witness. It should not be overlooked that
the defendant in Christian v. Williams, even if wanted only as a witness,
23
The
could have been compelled to appear and give his testimony.
24
Whether or
defendant in ihe principal case could only be invited.
not a non-resident witness gives his testimony is often a matter of accommodation. Public' policy would seem to demand that his privilege of
being sued in his own jurisdiction should not be forfeited because he
goes into a foreign jurisdiction to give testimony in a case to which
he is not a party. A citizen of this State who is asserting or defending
his rights should be enabled to procure the attendance of all such per19. R. S. Mo. 1879, Sec. 3481.
117
20. Wilson v. Donaldson (1888)
Ind. 35, 20 N. 1E.250.
21. For a discussion of the interpretation placed on the statutes see: Alderson on Judicial Wtrits, Sec. 120; Hale v.
Wharton (1896) 73 Fed. 739, citing but
not following Baisley v. Baisley and

Christian v. Williams.
22. Baisley v. Baisley, supra; Christian v. Williams, supra.
23. R. S. Mo., 1909, Sec. 1764, R. S
Mo., 1889, Sec. 2021.
24. Works, Courts and Their Jurisdiction, Sec. 37.
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sons as are necessary to support or defend his rights without molestation
25
He has no way of compelling a non-resident witof the witnesses.
ness to appear in court and give his testimony and such a witness, if he
is willing, should be allowed to approach the court free from fear of
hindrance or subjecting himself to service of civil process. Otherwise
he may not come at all.
It is submitted that an extension of the principle of Christian v.
Williams and Baisley v. Baisley as made in the case reviewed is not
desirable, but upon the contrary, upon reason and sound public policy the
doctrine of those two cases should be restricted to the exact facts in
issue in those cases.
I. C. N.
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE PURPOSE-DESGNATION op TRUSTEE. Robinson
v. Crutcher.1 This was an action by the heirs of Temple B. Robinson to
2
have the fifth, sixth and seventh clauses of Robinson's will construed.
The trial court held that valid charitable trusts were created. This finding was reversed by the Supreme Court en banc on the ground that
t'here was no separation of the legal and equitable estates; that there
was no bequest to "any natural or artificial entity;" but that the testator merely attempted to bequeath a certain part of his estate to the
"'capital" of certain public school funds. 4

Apparently there is an error in the opinion of the majority of the
Supreme Court in failing to give proper weight to that part of the seventh
clause which directed his "executors to pay over to the lawful custodians of the several public school funds mentioned in this and the two
preceding clauses of this will the several shares given to the said school
funds as aforesaid." (Italics supplied) Concededly, the language of
this provision is not artistic; that, however, is not a requirement with
25. Halsey v. Stewart (1817) 4 N. J.
L. 420.
1. (1919) 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104.
2. The- material portions of the will
follow:
"4th: The residue of my property
'of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situate, I will and direct shall be divided
into three equal parts.
"5th: One of such third parts I
give and bequeath to the capital of the
township school fund of T. 54, R. 10, in
Monroe county, Missouri.
"6th: One of such third parts I
give and bequeath to the capital of the
public school fund of Monroe county.
"7th: One of such third parts I
give and bequeath to the capital of the
public school tund of the State of Missouri and I direct my executor to pay
over to the lawful custodians of the several public school funds mentioned in

this and the two preceding clauses of
this will the several shares given the
said school funds as aforesaid."
3. Walker, J., writing the opinion in
which, Bond, C. J., Faris, and Graves,
JJ., concurred. Williams, T., wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Blair, J.,
concurred.
4. The following statement in the ma.
jority opinion seems not clear:
"Neither directly or by reasonable
implication is-a donee designated who
can take the legal title to the funds bequeathed and thus authorize the appointment of a trustee." If a donee had
been designated and he had become
vested with the legal title, what occassien would there be for the appointment of a trustee?
It there were a
trust the donee himself would be the
trustee.
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It is of course true that all the provisions in a will relating to a

particular subject should be considered together and the intent of the
testator ascertained without regard to crudities in expression.5 If, then,
the several clauses are read by a sympathetic eye, is it not plain that the
testator meant to vest the legal title of the property bequeathed in the
lawful custodians of the three separate school funds? There seems to
be no dispute that the three school funds really existed and that actual
human beings had custody of them at the time of the testator's death.
It is equally true that the beneficiaries of the trust (even tho they were
not expressly mentioned) are persons who would be benefited by the
administration of the capital of the several school funds. And this is
the point cf view of Williams, J., in his dissenting opinion.
The answer of the majority of the court to the above reasoning is
simply the statement that "it was the purpose of the donor to bequeath
these shares of his estate to the school funds themselves, and not to the
legal custodians of funds of like character." Was not the court unduly
critical in deciding that the testator had an absurd and impossible intention? This decision and the one in Jones v. Patterson 1 indicate that
the Supreme Court of Missouri does not look with great interest and
liberality upon charitable trusts. This strict view has been regretted.?
If it is conceded that the majority opinion is correct in its conclusion that the bequests to the capital of the school funds are a nullity
there still remains another angle of approach. There would seem to
be no doubt that it was the intention of the testator to create a charitable trust for educational purposes.$ The result would be, then, that
there has been the creation of a trust except that a trustee has not been
named. 9 Surely, it is too late to deny, and the majority opinion appar5. R. S. Mo., 1909, Section 583:
"All courts and others concerned in the
execution of last wills shall have due
regard to the directions of the will, and
the true intent and meaning of the testtator, in all matters brought before
them."
6. (1917) 271 Mo. 1, 195 S. W. 1004;
20 Law Series 53.
7. "Melancholy the spectacle must
always be, when covetous relatives seek
to convert to their own use the fortune which a testator has plainly devoted to a great public benefaction."
James Barr Ames, The Failure of the
"Tilden Trust," 5 Harv. L. Rev. 389,
Ames Lect. Leg. Hist. 285.
"In Robinson v. Crutcher, bequests 'to
the capital of' certain township, county
and state school funds were held to fail
because no trustees were named, although the testator directed his executor to Day over the bequests 'to the lawful custodians of the several public
The court
school funds mentioned.'
was of the opinion that direct gifts to

the funds were intended, which failed
because a fund could not be a legatee;
that there was no attempt to create a
trust, and that the court therefore could
not designate a trustee.
On this reasoning a gift to the Harvard Endowment Fund instead of to the trustees of
the fund would fail. The technically of
this decision can only be equaled by the
decisions in New York that a direct gift
to an unincorported charitable association cannot be upheld as a charitable
trust." (Italics supplied.)
Austin W.
Scott, 33 Harv. Law Rev. 695. Compare 19 Harv. Law Rev. 202.
8. The majority opinion in conceding
the "utmost" stated that, "it was the
purpose of the donor to add money to
money for the benefit of education." 277
Mo. 1. c. 9, 209 S. W. l.c. 106.
9. It is true that the majority opinion makes the following declaration:
"The question here involved is not,
as contended by respondent, the failure
to name a trustee" etc. 277 Mo. 1.c. 10,
209 S. W. 1.c. 107.
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ently concedes 10 that a charitable gift will not fail because of a failure
to designate a trustee. Schmidt v. Hess," an earlier Missouri decision,
states the correct doctrine. There one R executed and delivered a deed
in which the "Lutheran Church" was named as the grantee. There was
no entity by that name. The plaintiffs as trustees of the Evangelical
Lutheran Trinity Church brought a bill to vest title in the land in themselves and to restrain the defendants as trustees of the German Evangelical Central Congregation and others from interfering with their
use of it. Said the court: "No doubt is entertained that the gift
under consideration is a charity and falls within the meaning of the
rules of chancery. (2 Sto. Eq. Jur., 51164, and cases cited.) And although in consequence of the non-incorporation of the church for whose
benefit the grant was made, there was no one in esse, at the time of making the donation, capable of being the recipient of the trust; yet the
use being a charitable one, a court of equity having ascertained the intent of the grantor, will not allow the grant on that account to fail, but
will see to its effectuation." Accordingly, there was judgment for a
decree vesting title in the property in the plaintiffs, as trustees of the
2
This precedent furnished a corEvangelical Lutheran Trinity Church.'
rect solution of the principal case.
Shortly before the decision in the principal case, While v. Mayor and
3
Common Council of City of Newark' was decided by the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey. The facts in the latter case were even stronger against the valid creation of a charitable trust than they were in
14
A contrary result was reached in New Jersey. In
the Missouri case.
view of the fact that the opinion of the New Jersey Court is very clear
it is wondered whether it was called to the attention of and considered
by the Missouri court. The New Jersey court stated: "It is to be noted
that the gift is directly to the fresh air fund and not to a trustee. As far
as appears there is in Newark neither an incorporated nor an unincorporated body called the fresh air fund, and the evidence fails to show
the existence of any permanent fund of that description." (Italics
supplied.)
Nevertheless, the court held that the gift was to a charity and that
10.

"If

such a trust has been creat-

ed it will not be permitted to fail because a trustee has been erroneously or
uncertainly designated, but the court in
the exercise of its inherent equity juris277 Mo. 1.c.
diction will appoint one."
If the court
9, 209 S. W. i.c. 105.
meant that there could be no "trust" unless there was a trustee provided for in
some indefinite manner then the statement seems too restricted. The authorities are collected in 14 L. R. A. (N.S.)
109.
11.
(1875) 60 Mo. 591.

12.

Compare Lilly et al.

v.

Tobbein

et al. (1890) 103 Mo. 477, 486, 15 S.
W. 618 (dictum); Schneider v. Kloepple
(1917) 270 Mo. 389; 193 S. W. 834.
13. (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 5, 103 At.
1042.
14. The will under consideration in
the New Jersey case provided as follows:
"I give the interest of five thousand dollars to the fresh air fund of
Newark to be used every summer for
special needy cases that need to be sent
right away not to go in the general
fund, * * * the money I give to the

34
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since the bequest was for a specific object, the court would nominate a
trustee to administer the trust.
Nine years previous to the decision under review the Supreme
Court of Iowa 15 passed upon the same proposition in point of principle. 1 6 The conclusion of the Iowa court also was just the reverse of
the Missouri court. Apparently the decision was not cited by counsel and
no mention of it is made by the Missouri Supreme Court. It was argued
in the Iowa case that the bequest was invalid because "there is no such
fund, and that the gift is not to any person, corporation, individual or
thing capable of accepting it, and is therefore void for uncertainty." The
court concedel "that the statute has not created a fund specifically designated as a 'county permanent school fund' " and made this obvious re7
ply:1
"So also, tho no donee or trustee be named, or if one be named
who is incapable of taking and holding the gift for charitable uses, the
trust will not be allowed to fail, as a court of equity will supply the
proper trustec." 18
It is only necessary to contrast with the New Jersey and Iowa decisions one statement in the majority opinion of the Missouri case to
understand the cause of the decision believed to be an unfortunate one.
Says the Missouri court: "Hence, it would become necessary to sustain the same, to write into the will, otherwise clear and unambiguous,
the names of the donees who would take legal title to the funds bequeathed." 19
Yes, may be replied, this is necessary but it may be done, and
should be done, and has been done time and again by the chancellor
exercising equity jurisdiction. In every case where there is a failure to
name a trustee the court will have to appoint some one who will become invested with the legal title.
The final conclusion seems to be that whichever point of view is

fresh air fund of Newark, N. J. to be
put out at interest if not already invested." (Italics supplied.)
15. Chapman et al. v. Newell (1910)
146 Ia. 415, 125 N. W. 324.
16. The eighth or residuary clause of
the will provided: "All the rest and remainder of my !state including the proceeds of the land sold, and after the
payment of the legacies above named I
give, devise and bequeath absolutely
and without reservation to the perman-

ent school fund f Louisa county, Iowa."
17. Chapman v. Newell (1910)
146
Ia. i.c. 422, 125 N. W. l.c. 327.
18. The liberal point of view of the
Iowa court is shown by the following:
"This devise does not attempt to treat
the 'permanent school fund' as being in
itself a person or corporation capable of

receiving and enjoying the gift, but it
is as if the testator had said, 'I devise
and bequeath the remainder of my estate to increase the permanent school
fund of Louisa county,' or 'I give and

bequeath to Louisa county for a permanent school fund.' If, for instance, the
will had contained a devise 'to the
Schoolhouse Fund

of the

Independent

School District of Wapello in Louisa
County,' there would not be the slightest
hesitation on the part of any lawyer in
saying that this was a ood devise to
the independent district for the use or
upon the trust therein expressed." Compare the provisions under consideration
in the Missouri case, note 2, supra.
19. Robinson v. Crutcher (1919) 277
Mo. I.c.
9, 209 S. W. .c,106.
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taken, the majority opinion is incorrect; and it is to be hoped that in
the course of time the minority opinion will prevail.
.20
A. N. BROWN

CERTIORARI FROM THE SUPREME COURT TO THE COURT Ov APPEALS1
SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Ellison. The
Supreme Court of Missouri issued a writ of certiorari to the Kansas
City Court of Appeals on relator's contention that the latter court had
failed to follow the latest previous ruling of the Supreme Court in
2
Barnett v. Kansas City. The Constitution of Missouri, Section 15,
Article 6, has been interpreted to give authority to the Supreme Court
to quash a decision of the Court of Appeals if it conflicts with the latest
previous ruling of the Supreme Court. In considering whether the decision in the Barnett case conflicted with the rulings of the Supreme
Court, a question arose as to certain instructions given by the trial court
for the plaintiff. These instructions were not set out in their entirety
in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, but were only referred to therein. The question arose as to whether the scope of inquiry of the Supreme Court on certiorari extended to these instructions in their original
form. In deciding this point the court laid down the general rule that
on certiorari from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, any
written document referred to in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
were
thereby becomes as much a part of the record for review as if .it
set out in the opinion in haec verba. This doctrine of incorporation into
the record for review of written documents referred to in the Courts of
Appeals' opinions is a comparatively new ruling yet it seems to have
been established by the decisions during the last few years. State ex rel.
3
National Newspapers' Association v. Ellison held that the original
referred to in the opinion
trial
court,
when
to
the
as
presented
petition
of a court of appeals, may be brought up and reviewed along with the
4
opinion. Also, State ex rel. Heine Safety Boiler Co. v. Robertson says
that a previous opinion of the Court of Appeals in the same cause is
incorporated into the record by reference thereto in the opinion under
consideration and may be considered. State ex rel. Central Coal & Coke
Co. v. Ellison5 for the purpose of ascertaining the facts held that two
previous opinions of the Court of Appeals referred to in the opinionl
under consideration might be considered. To the same effect is State
6
ex rel. Quercus Lumber Co. v. Robertson. State ex rel. Hayes et al. v.
Ellison7 held an order of publication to be incorporated by reference

20. Senior, School of Law,
sity of Missouri.
1. (1920) 220 S. W. 498.
2. (1919) 214 S. W. 240.
3. (1915) 176 S. W. 11.

Univer-

4. (1916) 188 S. W. 101.
5. (1917) 270 Y'o. 645, 195 S. W.
722.
6. (1917) 197 S. W. 79.
7. (1916) 191 S. W. 49.
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thereto in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and the original order
was thereby brought up for review. State ex rel. Curtis v. BroaddusF
was decided prior to those cases just cited. It laid down the rule tha
the entire abstract of the record as filed in the Court of Appeals may be
brought up and examined on certiorari. The case is silent on the doctrine of incorporation and the rule seems to be too broad, because later
cases hold that the bill of exceptions is not to be reviewed on certiorari
by the Supreme Court to a Court of Appeals. On the other hand State
ex rel. Wahl v. Reynolds,9 goes so far as to state in the opinion that the
scope of inquiry should be limited to the present opinion of the Court
of Appeals that is under review, but the case is not a direct holding on
that point and the dictum is not being followed. Neither does that case
say anything about the doctrine of incorporation by reference. State
ex rel. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ellison'0 held that the Supreme Court
in determining on certiorari whether there is a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court will not look behind the recital in the opinion of the Appellate Court for a statement of the facts or evidence. State ex rel. Dunham v. Ellison" states that on certiorari to the Court of Appeals the
Supreme Court will not examine the bill of exceptions for the purpose of ascertaining the facts because a case brought up for review by
certiorari is not to be reviewed as if it were an appeal, but reviewed
only for the purpose of determining conflict of decision. The last two
cases represent the law regarding inquiry into the bill of exceptions for
the purpose of ascertaining the facts and apparently stand undisputed.12
It is wondered, though, whether the final word has been said as to
this feature of the inquiry. Frequently the most serious question in a
case is whether there is any evidence to sustain the judgment below.
Whether there is any evidence to sustain a complaint, though originally
regarded as a question of fact for the jury in the early days of the
modern jury trial, today is undoubtedly a question of law for the judge. 13
It is obvious then that if a court of appeals erroneously decides
that there is evidence to sustain a claim against a defendant when no
such evider.ce exists-and this can only be told by examining the bill
of exceptions-then it follows that a Court of Appeals can in reality
fail to follow the rule of law as announced in the last decision of the
Supreme Court. For as stated, whether there is any evidence of an as8. (1911)
238 Mo. 189, 142 S. W.
340.
9.
(1917) 272 Mo. 588, 199 S. W.
978.
10. (1915) 263 Mo. 509, 173 S. W. 690.
11. (1919) :213 S. W. 459; (1919) 213
S. W. 804.
12. (1918) 200 S. W.
1042; (1919)
257 Mo. 19, 210 S. W. 881.

13. Slades Case (1648)
Style 138;
Bushells Case (1670)
Vaughan
135;
Chichester v. Phillips (1680)
T. Raymond 404. "Buller, Justice.
1. Whether there be any evidence is a question
for the judge. Whether sufficient evidence is for the jury." Company of Carpenters v. Hayward (1780) 1 Doug. 374.
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serted right, duty, power or liability is a question of law. A decision that
there is not evidence cannot be tested unless the evidence given at the
trial is examined. If it will not be examined by the Supreme Court
it would seem that a finding that there is evidence or that there is not
evidence, which is a question of law, may be held differently by the
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. Such a condition is not
desirable. Harmony of actual decision was intended by the Constitution and not mere lack of obvious conflict on the face of written opinions.
Summing up these decisions it seems clear that the scope of inquiry on certiorari from the Supreme Court to a Court of Appeals extends primarily to the opinion of the Court of Appeals; but when it is
necessary to look further in order to throw more light upon whether
there is a real conflict of decision, the Supreme Court has adopted the
doctrine of incorporation into the record for review of written documents referred to in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The effect
of this has been to extend the scope of inquiry to the pleadings in the
case, orders of publication, previous opinions of the Court of Appeals
in the same cause, and finally by the principal case to the instructions
given to the jury by the trial court whenever reference is made to these
matters in the opinion of .the Court of Appeals. Clearly the scope of inquiry does not extend to the bill of exceptions or the facts or evidence other than as recited in the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals.
This doctrine of incorporation by reference is a fiction but it seems
to bring about a desired result. The justification for the fiction is that
it will tend to bring about harmony of actual decision rather than mere
harmony of written opinions. If the scope of inquiry were limited
to the opinion of a Court of Appeals it would often be impossible to
tell from a cleverly written opinion whether there was a conflict in
the application of a principle of law.
It is the actual application of legal principles that determines whether
14
justice or injustice has been done in any particular controversy.
JOHN P. RANDOLPH

CRIMINAL

LAw-RECEIVING

STOLEN

G0ODS-GUILTY

5

KNOWLEDGE.

State v. Ebbeller.1 This was a prosecution for receiving stolen goods.
The lower court instructed the jury that by the term "knowing" was
meant, "Such knowledge and information in his possession - - - - as
would put a reasonably prudent man, exercising ordinary caution, on
14. For a general discussion see 6
Law Series 3 and 13 Law Series 30.
15. Senior, School of Law, Univer-

sity of Missouri.
1. (1920) 222 S. W. 396; annotated
in 30 Yale Law Jour. 194.
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his guard and would cause such a man exercising such caution, and
under circumstances which you believe defendant received the property to believe and be satisfied that the property had been stolen." The
Supreme Court held the instruction erroneous.
Under the various statutes in England 2 and in the states of this
country3 making the receiving of stolen goods a felony, knowledge on
the part o5 the accused that the goods were stolen is essential to the
offence. In defining this element three positions are logically possible.
All of them have been set forth in reported cases- In a few of the earlier
decisions4 it was held that direct personal knowledge was necessary for
conviction and this rule has been adhered to in at least one American
jurisdiction. 5 The impossibility of proving such knowledge in the vast
majority of cases, however, has lead to its repudiation in England.6
This view has not been accepted generally in the United States.
In reacting against this impractical view, some courts have laid
down the rule that where the defendant receives goods under such
circumstances that a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence would
believe them to have been stolen, he will be deemed to have guilty
knowledge without proof of actual knowledge on his part.7 Under
this rule a conviction is possible in cases where the accused has no
knowledge of any kind that the goods were originally obtained by theft
or embezzlement. Mere negligence is permitted to take the place of
guilty knowledge in determining criminal liability. The rule has been
criticized in many American cases 8 and it would seem contrary to the
general pol;.cy of the common law to punish a negligent act unless the
negligent actor displays a disregard for human life or the personal
safety of another. Moreover, the words of the statute "knowing them
to have been stolen" 9 make it clear that the legislature intended to
make knowledge the gravamen of the offence thereby requiring a specific intent to be shuwn. Legislatures might have created criminal responsibility for the mere receiving of stolen goods with a general
criminal intent by the omission of the quoted words. In crimes of this
class negligence is never allowed to take the place of a criminal intent 0
2. 24-25 Vict. c. 96.
3. The provision in this state is See.
4554 R. S. 1909.

146.
7. Commonwealth v. Finn (1871) 108
Mass. 466;' State v. Feuerhaken (1895)

4. Rex v. Densley (1834) 6 C. & P.
399; Regina v. Rymes (1853) 3 C. &
K. 326. The remarks in these cases,
however, seem to be largely obiter. Perhaps the historical connection
between
misprision of felony and the receiving
oF stolen goods may account for the carrying over of this element from the
former to the latter offence.
5.
Young v. Commonwealth (1882)
4 Ky. Law R. 55, 11 Ky. Opin. 689.

96 Ia. 299, 65 N. W. 299; State v.
Druxinman (1904)
34 Wash. 257, 75
Pac. 814; Commonwealth v.
Leonard
(1886)
140 Mass. 473, 4 N.
E.
96.
(Semble).
8. State v. Roundtree (1908) 80 S. C.
387, 61 S. E. 1072, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.)
833; Robinson v. State (1882) 84 Ind.
452; Cohn v. People (1902) 197 Ill.482,
64 N. E. 306; State v. Alpert (1914) R8
Vt. 191, 92 Atl. 32.

6. Regina v. White (1859) 1 F. & F.
665; Rex v. Dunn (1826) 1 Moody C. C.

9. 4554 R. S. Mo. 1909.
10. May, Criminal Law, 3rd. Ed. Sec.
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unless it is clearly necessary to carry out the legislative policy involved
in the statute."'
In many jurisdictions a third view seems to prevail although it has
not been formulated or defined with any particular clearness by the
courts. According to this rule personal knowledge by the accused is
2
This knowledge need not be an exact acpart of the corpus delicti.'
quaintance with the circumstances of the original theft or embezzle3
It is sufficient to prove that at the time the acment of the goods.'
cused received the goods, he believed from the circumstances under
which he got them that they had been obtained by the person giving
4
It would
them into his possession through embezzlement or theft.
seem that if the reception of the goods under such circumstances as
would place the average man on his guard is proved, the jury might,
in the absence of countervailing evidence, reasonably conclude that the
5
defendant had such a belief.'
They must be satisfied, however, that he actually did so believe,
not that, measured by the norm of the hypothetical reasonably prudent
man, he should have so believed- Under this view an actual guilty
knowledge as distinguished from negligence on the part of the defendant must be found by the jury.
The instruction given by the trial court in the principal case embodied the second of these rules. The court seems to have followed a
form which for some years has been in general use with the trial
courts of this state. The existence of this custom is evidenced by the
presence of this instruction in lists of instructions set out in the re16
In none of the earlier cases was
ports of cases in the Supreme Court.
the precise point raised on appeal. In State v. Kosky,'7 however, the
point seems to have been decided. In this case the state relied on evidence that the accused knew that the boy from whom he took the
goods was of dishonest character. The instruction was identical with
the one in the principal case. It would seem that under these facts
the giving, of such an instruction by the trial court, if incorrect, would
have been prejudicial to the defendant. The court said: "There was
no error in the instructions." But there was no further discussion of
34; Ogeltree v. State (1856) 28 Ala. 693;
U. S. v. Moore (1873) Fed. Case
15803.
11. U. S. v. Thompson (1882) 12 Fed.
245.

principle applied here as follows: "Proof
of the reasonable cause of belief may
warrant a jury in finding knowledge but
it is not the legal equivalent of knowledge."

13. Huggins v. People (1890) 135 Il1.
243, 25 Am. St. R. 357, 25 N. E. 1002.
14. The best statement of the rule
seems to be in People v. Groves (1918)
284 Ill. 429, 120 N. E. 277. Lowell, J.,
in U. S. v. Moore, Fed. Case 15803, in
speaking of another crime, stated the

State (1904) 121 Ga. 477, 49 S. E. 597;
State v. Goldblat (1892) 50 Mo. App.
186.
16. State v. Sakowski (1905) 191 Mo.
605, 90 S. W. 435, 4 Ann. Cas. 751.
17. State v. Speritus (1905) 191 Mo.
24, 90 S. W. 459.

12. State v. Roundtree (1908)
C. 387, 61 S. E. 1072.

80 S.

15. See the following cases: Adams v.
State (1875) 52 Ala. 379; Blumenthal v.
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the point here involved. In so far as this case stands for the proposition that mere negligence will take the place of a true guilty knowledge
it is overruled by the case under review.
The court in the principal case is silent as to the exact theory of
guilty knowledge adopted in this state. Does it, then, intend to require
proof of direct knowledge in the sense of the earlier English decisions
on the point? It would seem that it does not. The court cited with
approval certain Federal cases1s which display a strong tendency toward
the third rule stated above. 19
The Federal Court cited with approval
Cohn v. People' where it is stated: "It is true, that proof of direct
knowledge is not necessary, 'rod that evidence of facts and circumstances sufficient to create in the minds of the accused a belief that the
goods were stolen may amount to guilty knowledge of the fact."
21
The decision in the principal case fails to notice State v. Goldblat
which decided that proof that the accused obtained the goods from a
young boy of known bad character at an abnormally low price, was
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that he had a guilty knowledge
of the larceny of the goods. Under the theory above elaborated that
case may be reconciled with the principal case. In the Goldblat case
the jury could have found that the defendant had actual belief that the
goods were stolen. Therefore it is believed that the case under review
does not overrule the Goldblat case and that in Missouri the third view
stated above is the rule that will prevail.
22
BEN ELY, JR.

EVIDENCE-HusBAND

AND

WIFE-CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS.

Gisel v. Gisel.1 In the above case the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided that in a divorce suit, the plaintiff-wife's testimony of a conversation between herself and husband, not within the hearing of a third person, in which he accused her of infidelity, was properly excluded as a
confidential communication. The court apparently realized the undesirability of the holding and came to it with regret that it had no choice
18. Kasle v. U. S. (1916)
233 Fed.
878. 147 C. C. A. 552; Peterson v. U. S.
(1914) 213 Fed. 920.
19. "It is rot meant to say, however,
that conviction cannot be established
upon circumstantial evidence.
While
there was direct testimony, and specific
denial, of guilty knowledge on defendant's part, yet there were in addition
circumstances of more or less tendency
to show as well as to refute such knowledge; the relevancy of such circumstances, when not too remote, cannot of
course be rightly denied; but, apart
from instructions as to whether the

property was in fact stolen, no difficulty
is perceived in applying the circumstances directly to the accused with a
view of testing the question of notice
or knowledge on his part, at the times
he received the goods and chattels, that
they had been stolen (if in fact they
were stolen)." Kasle v. United States
(1916) 233 Fed. 1. c. 886.
20. (1902) 197 I11. 1. c. 485, 64 N. E.
1. c. 307.
21. (1892) 50 Mo. App. 186.
22. Junior, School of Law, University
of Missouri.
1. (1920) 219 S. W. 664.
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but to follow Moore v. Moore2 and Berlin v. BerlinA previously decided
by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The branch of the law of evidence involved in the decision of
this point appears to be in confusion. The chief cause of this confusion has been the failure of the courts to clearly distinguish between: (1)
The disqualification of husband and wife to testify for the other ;4 (2)
the privilege against the giving of adverse testimony by one against the
other;5 and (3) the privilege involved here, i. e. the privilege against
6
the husband or wife giving testimony as to confidential communications.
The American courts have repeatedly grouped the disqualification and the
7
two privileges together in one sweeping and grossly inaccurate rule.
The decisions in this state cannot be excepted from this criticism.
In Moore v. Moore, supra, the decision was that a husband was a
qualified witness where his wife was the opposing party in a divorce
suit. The language of the opinion does express a limitation that "they
are not allowed to testify in regard to the communications from one to
the other" 8 but this appears to be nothing more than dictum.
In Berlin v. Berlin, supra, an action by the wife for support and
maintenance, the wife was permitted to testify as to conversations between herself and husband and as to certain admissions made by him to
her. Sherwood, J., in delivering the opinion of the court affirming the
general term, which reversed the special term, said: "The witness was
clearly incompetent as to any conversations had with defendant, or as to
any admissions made to her by him." 9 At the same time it was made
clear that there was no intention to question the rule that either spouse
was a competent witness in a proceeding between spouses as to matters
other than those set forth in the above quotation. As to the main point
the court reasoned in this general and somewhat rhetorical manner:
"Communications of husband and wife inter sese are privileged, and are sedulously guarded by seal of that absolute inviolability which the law places upon the hallowed intimacies
of the marital relation. So strictly has the law, on the grounds
of public policy, enforced the observance of this rule, that
2.
3.

(1872)
(1873)

51 Mo. 118.
52 Mo. 151.

ceptionally;
lege; 2245,

2241-2243, exercise of privistatutory changes.

4. Wigmore on Evidence. section 600.
history of the rule; 601, policy of the
rule; 603, -theory of the common law
rule; 604. waiver; 605, who is excluded; 606.609, on whose behalf: 610. effect of death and divorce; 612, excep-

6. Wigmore on Evidence. section
2332, policy of the privilege; 2333, his.
tory of the privilege; 2334, marital disqualification and anti-marital orivilege
distinguished; statutory enactment; 23362338, scope of the testimony privileged;

tions;

2339,

619-620,

statutory

5. Wigmore

on

abolition.

Evidence . section

2227, history of the privilege; 2228, policy of the privilege; 2230-2231. who is
prohibited as husband and wife: 22322233, what is prohibited testimony; 2234is
anti-marital:
2237, what testimony
2239, anti-marital testimony admitted ex-

persons

prohibited

and

entitled:

2341, cessation of privilege. See also 40
Cyc. 2353 par. 3 and cases cited.
7. Wigmore
on Evidence. section
2334, the disqualification and the two
privileges distinguished.
8.
(1873) 51 Mo. 1. c. 119.
9. (1873) 52 Mo. I. c. 152.
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in no instance and for no purpose has its infraction ever been
permitted; and on this point our statute is but declaratory of
the common law." 10

(Italics

supplied.)

In both cases the court failed to distinguish between (a) the disqualification at common law because of interest, (b) the disqualification
of one spouse testifying for the other, (c) the privilege as to one spouse
testifying against the other, and (d) the privilege for confidential communications between spouses. It has been thought in these cases that
the statute removing the disqualification because of interest was in effect
construed to remove the interest disqualification of the spouse in actions between spouses and also to prevent the exercise of the privilege as
to one spouse testifying against the other.11
In Moore v. Moore, supra, it is not clear that anything besides the
disqualification on account of interest was definitely considered by the
court. In Berlin v. Berlin, supra, while the objection was to one spouse
testifying against the other, it was stated as if that made the spouse incompetent. The disqualification but not the privileges made the spouse
incompetent at common law. Furthermore, the court in Berlin v. Berlin
apparently thought that no communications between spouses could be admitted as evidence. There was no such rule at common law. There was
a privilege as to confidential communications, but it is to be remembered
that a privilege is not the same thing as a disqualification and that all
communications are not confidential. A disqualification is absolute and
need only be called to the attention of the court by either party to be invoked, whereas a privilege can be asserted only by the one to whom it
belongs.
Moreover, it soon became necessary for Sherwood, J., himself, to
make a distinction between' communications generally and confidential
communications. In Darrer v. Darrer12 an action by the husband
against the wife to divest her of title to land, he was held competent to
testify as to a communication from himself to the wife on the ground
that the rule did not apply to communications not in themselves of a confidential nature. In Henry.v. Sneed,1 3 where the husband and wife had
been induced by fraud to execute a deed of trust, it was held "the testimony of both husband and wife was, ex necessitate, competent as to their
conversation, on two grounds: that those conversations were a part of
the res gestae, and on the foot of fraud." 14 Apparently, the conversations between the husband and wife were of a confidential nature. It
10. (1873) 52 Mo. 1. c. 152.
11. Wigmre on Evidence. section
2245.
12. (1874) 58 Mo. 222, opinion by
Sherwood, 3.
13. (1889) 99 Mo. 407, 12 S. W. 663.
17 Am. St. Rep. 580, opinion by Sherwood, J.

14. In Sauter and Adams v. Scrutchfield (1887) 28 Mo. App. 150 one of the
issues was whether the wife had been
supplied with the necessaries of life by
her husband and it was held that a case
of that kind should form an exceotion to
the general rule. The fact that she had
not been supplied with the necessaries
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was observed by the court that the cause of action was not one between
the husband and wife. But the court failed to observe that it was an adversary and not one of the spouses who objected to the evidence. It
is not clear but apparently the husband and wife were the plaintiffs. Obviously, then, there could be no objection because one spouse was testifying against the other. 15 Whether they were disqualified because they
were testifying for each other when both were parties in interest was not
specifically considered.-6 Considered as a matter of confidential communication, alone, it could have been said that it was not a privilege that
the adversary could assert.' 7 Nevertheless, the court apparently treated the situation as an exception to the general rule concerning confiden8
tial communications between husband and wife.'
It is evident, therefore, that exceptions have been made to the broad
proposition stated by Sherwood, J., in Berlin v. Berlin. Does an exception exist in divorce suits where the grounds urged to support the action
can be proved only by the testimony of the husband or wife as to confidential communications? This precise question, apparently, has not been
before the Supreme Court of Missouri since Berlin v. Berlin, if it may
properly be said to have been before the court then. In Miller v. Miller,'6
Lewis, P. J., referred to the problem in this manner: "It has long been
settled in Missouri, that charges of infidelity made by the husband without
any just cause, are such personal indignities as the statute contemplates
in defining the grounds for a divorce ......
If it be the policy of social
regulations in this state, that the making of such charges may properly
eventuate in the dissolution of the marriage tie, the question may be asked, how can that policy be sustained by a rule which, in many cases,
closes the mouth of the only person who can testify to the injurious fact,
and for whose especial protection the law was made?" 20
The problem was met in a rather unsatisfactory manner in Maget v.
Maget.2 1 In a suit for divorce the wife testified concerning the abuse
she sustained from her husband, of certain protests and declarations
of life was a matter peculiarly within
her own knowledge and in the privacy
of domestic life generally unknown to
others. It was held that under the circumstances she was a competent witness
for her husband-defendant.
The court
apparently saw no difference between the
disqualification of one spouse for the
other and the privilege as to one soouse
testifying against the other. In Moeckel v. Heim (1896) 134 Mo. 576. 36 S. W.
226, a case involving fraud. Henry v.
Sneed (1889) 99 Mo. 407, 12 S. W. 663.
17 Amer. St. Rep. 580 was cited and
followed.
15. Furthermore, the adversary could
not ask for the benefit of the privilege.
Wigmore on Evidence, section 2241. note
5

16. See Wigmore on Evidence. section
613; Buck v. Ashbrook (1873) 51 Mo.
539. See also R. S. Mo., 1909, section
6359.
17. Wigmore
on
Evidence, section
2340.
18. Wigmore on Evidence,
section
2338.
19. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 418.
20. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 1. c. 420. The
court states "that while both parties
may testify in a divorce suit. neither
should be permitted to relate private utterances of any description which have
been addressed by the one to the other."
1. c. 421. Despite the admission of such
utterances the judgment, nisi, was affirmed because the error was harmless.
21. (1900) 85 Mo. App. 6.
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made by her to him and of his replies thereto. Apparently the communications were confidential. The action of the trial court in granting a
divorce was approved. The decision fails to distinguish between the
privilege one spouse has to prevent the other from testifying against
him or her and the privilege as to confidential communications. It would
seem that both privileges were involved. The court discussed the problem as if the former privilege was the only one to be considered. Moore
v. Moore, supra, was cited but it would seem that the dictum rather than
the decision was in the mind of the court. Berlin v. Berlin, supra, was
not cited and it was not observed that these two cases had removed the
disqualification on account of interest in actions between the spouses, and
the privilege of one spouse testifying against the other. At least, that
seems to be the proper interpretation of those decisions. 22 The court in
the Maget case made its decision on the basis of an exception to the
privilege as to one spouse testifying against the other. A number of exceptions to this privilege were recognized at common law but it seems
that this was not generally extended to divorce proceedings. 23 Furthermore, it would seem that the same exceptions should be recognized as to
the privilege for confidential communications. 24 Therefore, the Maget
case would seem to stand for an exception to the privilege as to confidential communications where the exercise of the privilege would work
a cruel injustice upon one spouse in controversies between them.
It is not thought that this interpretation of Maget v. Maget necessarily conflicts with Berlin v. Berlin, supra. The latter case is obscurely
reported and at most attempts to state a general doctrine. Several decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court sufficiently establish exceptions to
the general language.2 5 It does not appear that there was any compelling necessity for announcing an exception in Berlin v. Berlin. But
in the case tinder review the failure to recognize an exception means that
a rule of evidence deprives a person of the benefit of a rule of substantive law which is well established as a part of the social policy of the
state. 26 If this point of view had been taken, the decision in the case
under review would not have worked a possible injustice. While the
22. See note 11, supra.

(dictum); Rose v. Rose (1908)

129 Mo.

23. Wigmore
on
Evidence.
section
2239.
24. Wigmcre
on
Evidence,
section
2338,
citing
the
following
Missouri

App. 175, 107 S. W. 1089. It may be
noticed that confidential statements between the spouses were admitted in the
last named case. Since the suit was un-

cases: Henry v. Sneed (1889)

contested there was no objection and the

99 Mo.

407, 12 S. W. 663; Moeckel v. Heim
(1896) 134 Mo. 576, 36 S. W. 226, 17
Am. St. Rep.
580; Rice v.
Waddill
(1902) 168 Mo. 99, 67 S. W. 605.
25. See note 24, supra.

point is not discussed. It seems unsatisfactory to have a substantive right depend upon a contested case and an objection to the testimony. In Miller v.
Miller, supra, it is suggested that a "vit-

26. R. S. Mo., 1909. see. 2370; Miller
v. Miller (1383) 14 Mo. App. 1. c. 420
(dictum); Clinton v. Clinton (1895) 60
Mo. App. 296; Ashburn v. Ashburn
(1903) 101 Mo. App. 365. 74 S. W. 394

uperative epithet" and a "mere protest
of a wife against her husband's conduct" could not be a confidential communication; but quaere.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

distinction between the suggested exception and the decision in Berlin v.
Berlin, supra, may be a fine one, still it forms the only apparent justification for the decision in Maget v. Maget, supra. Since the latter decision is highly desirable it is to be regretted that it was not discussed in
the principal case and it is hoped that it will be27 upheld by the Supreme
Court whenever the question is presented there.
DuPuy
v.
Schweikert
27. In Schweikert
(1904) 108 Mo. App. 477, 83 S. W.
1095 it was said by say of dictum that
private communications between husband
and wife are not admissible but "where
from the peculiar nature of the inquiry,
the information sought is peculiarly within the knowledge of the wife, the necessity for her testimony may outweigh
public policy and the rule disqualifying
her as to such statements may be relaxed or suspended." In Meyer v. Meyer (1911) 158 Mo. App. 299, 138 S. W.
70, the exception as to the rule for conrdential communications is stated in

WARRICK.
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broad terms but nothing is gained by
denominating the communications as
"verbal assaults." In Grusser v. Gruner (1914) 183 Mo. App. 157, 165 S. W.
865 the same judge who wrote the opinion in Meyer v. Meyer, supra, announced by way of dictum a conclusion contrary to the one he wrote three years before and admitted that he had stated the
rule "too broadly." See Revercomb v.
Revercomb (1920) 222 S. W. 899 1. c.
905, a decision by the Kansas City Court
of Appeals ignoring Maget v. Maget.
28. Junior, School of Law. University
of Missouri.-Ed.

